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Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism 
The ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) are significant 
enough to be compared to a watershed in Western thought. In 
his mind were gathered up the major interests of the Enlighten-
ment: science, epistemology, and ethics; and all of these were 
given a new direction which he himself described as another 
Copernican revolution. As Copernicus had shown that the earth 
revolved around the sun, rather than the sun around the earth, 
so Kant showed that the knowing subject played an active and 
creative role in the production of his world picture, rather 
than the static and passive role which the early Enlightenment 
had assigned him. This change of emphasis from object to sub-
ject can be seen in the appearance of the new word, Weltan-
schauung/ And the form which this change took was one type of 
idealism, although different from the idealism of Berkeley. 
Kant can with equal justice be called the philosopher of 
the Reformation, the philosopher of the Revolution, and the 
father of contemporary philosophy. From the point of view of 
Western thought all of these titles are apt indications of his 
role. From the point of view of this chapter it is the last 
title which is of the greatest significance, because it indi-
cates that it was Kant who set the direction of subsequent 
philosophy for more than a century, defining its problems as 
well as suggesting its solutions. While human problems often 
seem constant, the form that they take varies with the cul-
ture of a particular period; and our way of asking many of our 
most important questions is peculiarly Kantian: How can we 
balance the moral autonomy of the individual with the group's 
demand for authority? What is the difference between religion 
and ethics? Where, if at all, does science leave off and 
ethics begin? Can we ever get beyond our experience and see 
things as they really are? 
Kant's influence on Western thought can also be seen in 
the suggested solutions to such problems, as can be gathered 
from some of the phrases which we often use in our ordinary 
* Reprinted from Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Prin~ 
ciples of Morals and Legislation... (Oxford at the Clarendon 
Press: London, 1892), pp."1-7, 24-32. 
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conversation. Our concern with the active and practical ("what 
you do is more important than what you say"), our concern with 
the moral nature of the universe ("you can't get away with 
that")., our concern with persons ("the supreme value of the 
individual person"), our concern with the relation between eth-
ics and practice ("honesty is the best policy"), our concern 
with man's will and inner motives ("you can if you will only 
try hard enough"), and finally our interest in aesthetics and 
the ethical aspect of religion all have deep roots in the 
thought of Kant. 
Immanuel Kant was born in Ko~nigsberg in East Prussia. His 
family were ordinary workers of strong pietistic background. 
Here he grew up, was educated, taught., and wrote. He scarcely 
ever left his home town, and never his state, despite offers of 
positions elsewhere. His whole life was so regulated that it is 
said housewives set their clocks by his afternoon walk. He en-
joyed eating meals with others, especially with sea captains. 
Beyond these contacts he had very few relations with the out-
side world. Indeed, his life became the stereotype for the 
typical German professor, 
Kant entered the university at Konigsberg when the German 
Enlightenment was in full swing, and began to teach there in 
1755, He was not promoted to full professorial rank until 1770, 
despite his twice applying for positions which had become vacant. 
His long wait for advancement was due i.n large part to the fact 
that Konigsberg was founded as a purely Lutheran university, and 
there was some question as to how "pure" his piety really was. 
It was also due to the enthusiasm he had shown for Rousseau, one 
of the few people who made an important contribution to Kant's 
thought. Up to the time of his professorial appointment Kant 
had been working primarily on scientific problems, and indeed, 
if he had done nothing else, his reputation would have been well 
established in this field. But he was also interested in philo-
sophical problems, and by the time of his inaugural dissertation 
the main lines of his even more important philosophical thinking 
were beginning to take shape. 
From his pupils we learn that Kant was, especially in his 
early years, an excellent teacher. Within ten years of his pro-
motion his presence made Konigsberg one of the major universi-
ties of Europe, His teaching covered a wide range of subjects 
both scientific and philosophical; he was the first one to offer 
a course in physical geography in an European university. Such 
was his influence that soon his students were being appointed 
to faculty positions, as well as to administrative posts, through-
out Germany, His teaching methods represented a combination 
of lecturing on the prescribed texts with the older medieval 
disputation. While this method did not serve to keep him from 
expressing his own opinions, it did serve to channel his creative 
work into writing, 
Kant's writings ranged widely over the fields of science, 
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ethics, philosophy, and religion. Of all these the most influ-
ential were those on philosophy. Of the philosophical works 
there are three which are of outstanding importance: The 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781) which represented his epistemol-
ogy; The ~ritique of Practical Reason (1787) his ethics; and 
The Critique of Juagment (1790) which included his aesthetics. 
In addition to these there are two other works which we should 
note: the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and 
the Religion within the Limits of ReaslSn^ATone (1793) . 
This last work was published after Frederick the Great 
(1740-1786) had died, when there was a new king and a new of-
ficer in charge of education, both of whom were interested in 
stamping out any possible religious or political heresies. 
Kant's enthusiasm for the thought of Rousseau and the French 
Revolution which was then in full tide, plus the very title of 
the book, strongly suggested the probability of less than or-
thodox opinions. He was called to account and forced to re-
frain from teaching or publishing on the subject of religion. 
This prohibition he accepted, and kept until the king died. 
But he was well aware that in so doing he was not playing the 
role of a Socrates. He explained his conduct by stating: 
"Recantation and denial of one's inner convictions is base, 
but silence in a case like the present is a subject's duty. 
And if all that one says must be true, it does not follow that 
it is one's duty to tell publicly everything which is true." 
Each of Kant's major works is called a critique, and his 
philosophy is often called a critical philosophy. However, a 
critical philosophy is not necessarily merely negative or 
skeptical; in the sense in which he used the word a positive 
or constructive element was always involved. Yet it cannot be 
denied that Kant's position was radically critical, especially 
of those whom he called dogmatists. One of his primary aims 
was to show that many of the things which the dogmatists tried 
to prove by reason were impossible to prove because human reason 
was not equipped to do what they demanded of it. 
These dogmatists represented the philosophical tradition 
known as rationalism. German rationalism tended to emphasize 
the powers of human reason in the attempt to obtain knowledge. 
First of all, the rationalists pointed out that thinking is 
often able to proceed a priori, which is simply to say that 
reason does not always have to' consult experience, but can go 
before it, in order to verify the truth of what it knows. Such 
a priori truth had, in addition, a superior kind of certainty. 
W e do not, for example, have to know anything about the weather 
in order to know that it will either rain on July 4, 1999, or 
that it will not. Such truths may be trivial, but they provided 
the rationalist with the hope that perhaps there were other 
truths, equally evident and equally independent of all sense 
experience, which were not so trivial. Acting on the presup-
position, at least partially supported by their work in mathe-
matics, that such truths do exist and can be discovered by human 
. ! :~MH~1 US ! 
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reason, the rationalists brought forth "proofs" for such "facts" 
as the creation of the world, the existence of God, freedom, and 
immortality. 
By means of these proofs the rationalists claimed to estab-
lish the truth of certain facts about the world in a manner 
which was both nonempirical and independent of all revelation. 
Kant began his career as such a dogmatic rationalist, and never 
abandoned the view that reason could proceed a priori in certain 
matters. He noted, however, that the rationaT dogmatists often 
fell into a trap, one which he described as resulting in the 
"antinomies" of reason. When it engages in the construction of 
such proofs as those of God, freedom, and immortality, reason 
ultimately contradicts itself, because there are equally good 
arguments both for and against such things. Each argument 
proves its position by pointing out the "absurdities" in its 
opposite. There was no way, Kant felt, to resolve such a con-
tradictory situation if one were simply limited to the choice 
between two such opposing lines of argument. Each side had 
equally good arguments. But, reason could not rest in contra-
diction, and Kant must, therefore, somehow resolve the contra-
diction. The way he took was certainly radical. He simply 
prohibited reason from engaging in such proofs. The rational-
ists had erred in claiming that there was an inherent harmony 
between our reason and nature such as would enable reason to 
proceed on its own into areas where human experience could not 
follow. The antinomies were, therefore, proof that reason did 
not constitute or determine the nature of reality. Where reason 
leads to contradiction, reason must be in error; and, where 
reason cannot find a way to correct its errors, there reason 
does not belong. 
Kant himself gave David Hume the credit for having awakened 
him from his "dogmatic slumbers." The major impetus toward 
Kant's independent position was provided by Hume's analysis of 
the concept of causality. Hume had maintained the principle 
that every event has a cause could not be demonstrated: it 
could not be deduced a priori from some other principle or a 
posteriori from experJence. Nor could it be accepted as seTf-
evident, as we can imagine events without causes. Kant found 
this conclusion irrefutable, although he did not agree with it. 
As a Newtonian scientist, he felt that the principle of caus-
ality was obviously an a priori one because we do, in one way 
or another, know in advance that every event must have a cause. 
Kant concluded that causality, and principles like it, did 
not describe the world of nature. They were, rather, only rules 
according to which men must reason if they wish to organize 
their experience of nature; As such they were neither dogmatic 
nor constitutive o~ nature, but rather critical and regulative 
of thought. When the scientist uses reasons to organize the 
data of his experience he must look for causes and assume that 
they are there. He does this because he would not be rational 
if he did otherwise, and not because he knows for a fact that 
the causes are there. 
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Note that the principle of causality regulates reason only 
in its dealing with sensible experience such as we associate 
with science and its investigations. Outside this realm the 
rule of causality simply does not apply. And it does not apply 
precisely because it is a principle of reason which tries to 
construct a science of experience. The dogmatic rationalists 
had been using reason to establish factual claims outside ex-
perience, such as the existence of God, and only paradox could 
result from such an illegitimate activity. 
Causality is not, of course, the only regulative principle. 
Kant thought, for example, that Euclidian geometry was eternally 
valid for all experience precisely because perception automatic-
ally imposed such a structure on experience. Such principles 
represented the form imposed on the matter of experience by a 
reason which sought to understand that experience. Nor were 
such regulative principles confined to the work of reason when 
it was trying to construct a science of experience. Reason con-
cerned itself with the practical decisions of daily life as 
well. Here also there were rules to be followed; and it was 
these rules which were the subject matter of his discussion of 
morality. 
The fundamental concept in Kant's discussion of morals was 
duty. In this regard he was very much the child of his pietis-
tic parents. A person's moral worth was determined by the 
motives of his actions. Just as Luther tells us that we are to 
obey the moral law out of our pure love and faith in God, with-
out regard to the rewards which might derive from such actions, 
so Kant tells us that we are to obey the moral law out of pure 
respect for that law as such. The moral law commands us abso-
lutely; and, as rational and moral agents, we are to obey it 
absolutely, without regard to the passions or desires which 
Hume and Bentham had thought so important, or for their gratifi-
cations. 
In such a morality it is imperative that we know what our 
duties are. Kant does not allow us to derive them from any 
consideration of expediency, or from revelation. As rules or 
laws they cannot be derived from the study of experience, be-
cause statements containing what ought to be are of a completely 
different kind from statements concerning what i_s. All law 
presupposes a legislator, and in the case of the moral law, each 
rational agent must be his own legislator. 
The will which legislates the moral law for itself, how-
ever, is not a purely subjective will, as the Romanticists had 
suggested. It is also objective because it is common to all 
rational beings. This regulative principle of the practical 
reason Kant calls the categorical imperative. It is the rule 
by which the rational will regulates itself according to the 
general principles of practical reason. Although Kant calls it 
the categorical imperative he gives it three different formula-
tions. He asserts, somewhat mystically, that all three are the 
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same. The first and most important of these we will find in 
the selection which we are to read: "I should never act in such 
a way that I could not wish that my maxim should be a universal 
law." The second was: "Treat all persons, including yourself, 
as ends always, and never as means." And the third: "Act 
always as though you were both subject and sovereign in a king-
dom of ends." In these ways he tried to make clear the obliga-
tion of the moral will, but without answering the demand to be 
specific. 
By thus limiting reason Kant also freed faith, which made 
just as strong demands on him, from any dependence on dogmatic 
reason. He found it necessary, he says, "to deny knowledge, in 
order to make room for faith. The dogmatic of metaphysics ... 
is the source of that unbelief, always very dogmatic, which is 
against morality." Because scientific reason was restricted in 
the ways which have been suggested to the world of human experi-
ence (phenomena in Kant's terminology), it was incapable of 
reaching the realm of reality external to that experience 
(noumena). Thus scientific reason could tell us nothing about 
those very things to which faith addressed itself: God, freedom, 
and immortality. Kant was, however, too much of a rationalist 
to leave these matters to unaided faith, as some romantic re-
ligionists had suggested. For him these things became the neces-
sary consequences of his moral philosophy. All three were needed 
if the demands of the categorical imperative were to be upheld. 
The concept of moral action implies that such acts must be free, 
and that they deserve a greater reward than they can be assured 
of in this life, hence the necessity for God, freedom, and im-
mortality. And so, instead of dogmatic proofs for such things, 
Kant gives us moral arguments for them. Without them the cate-
gorical imperative would be unthinkable. On the practical side 
also they are united because we are to fulfill the demands of 
duty as though these demands were the will of God. 
These two aspects of Kant's thought, science and morality, 
were held together by means of a third aspect, his aesthetics. 
In turning to aesthetic feeling he thought that his major ideas 
could be brought into harmony without losing their unique roles 
and contributions. In the third Critique he attempted especially 
to delineate the role of aesthetics. But his last years were 
saddened by the increasing weakness of his mental as well as his 
physical powers. When he died he was buried in the cathedral 
at Konigsberg, and over his grave were placed his own words: 
The starry heavens above me, 
The moral law within me. 
However, Kant had also written that the starry heavens above and 
the moral law within "fill me with awe." And in this the voice 
of his pietistic background spoke once again, but in a different 
language, the language of aesthetics, revealing him as in many 
ways the summation of the Enlightenment as well as the harbinger 
of the future.
 t' 
Because of Kant's interest in the problems of human action, 
XII p. 59 
a discussion of his thought is a good place to call attention 
to a distinction which is sometimes important: the distinction 
between ethics and morals. These two terms are often used in-
terchangeably, but they actually call our attention to different 
aspects of the same problem. Ethics was originally a Greek word 
and, as an integral part of that culture, served to call one's 
attention to the need for his making up his own mind concerning 
the standard for his actions, to arrive at a judgment with re-
gard to what is meant by such things as the good, rather than 
to accept either traditional or current standards. For this 
Western Civilization is indebted to the thought of Socrates, 
Morals was originally a Latin word and served to focus atten-
tion upon the active and social aspect rather than the evalu-
ative and individual aspect of human actions. One uses either 
ethics or morals, depending upon which aspect of human action 
he wishes to emphasize. For this reason we can take an ethics 
course in the philosophy department, while a sociology course 
may include the study of the morals of certain cultures. 
The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) fol-
lowed after Kant's f irst"~Critique, which~"h"ad been intended as 
an introductory study to the whole field of philosophy, but had 
not reached completion. In the Foundations, from which our 
selection is taken, Kant followed his usual method of analysis, 
attempting to show that the facts of moral experience needed 
the principles of reason to explain them, while these same moral 
principles needed to be justified in terms of experience. The 
strength of his position is found in his insistence on holding 
firmly to both sides of the moral discussion, the ought and the 
is. While the thoughts suggested in the first part of the 
Foundations were further elaborated in the second Critique, the 
earlier book established the basic ideas of Kant's thought in 
this whole area. It was to these that Schiller referred when he 
said: "Concerning the ruling ideas in the practical part of 
Kant's system only philosophers disagree, but men have always 
been unanimous." 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrighted Material Removed 
 
To see this publication, or an earlier translation or edition, please see  
“Additional Resources” on the cover page. 
